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Abstract
In this article, I trace struggles regarding EU internalmobility andmigrant labour as they emerge in themobilization of South
European migrants in Berlin. The effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and European austerity politics have reoriented
migration flows within the EU, increasing South-to-North migration with Germany as a prime destination. German public
discourse on the matter reveals a view on (EU) migration that focuses on its economic ‘usefulness’ and tries to regulate it
accordingly. EU citizenship turns out to be a key instrument of such EU internal ‘migration management’. The emergence
of migrant activist groups, however, hints at another force at play. In their fight for social rights and better working condi-
tions, migrant activists show they will not allow themselves to be easily ‘managed’ into precarious ‘productivity’. Against
this background, I argue that EU internal mobility is a field of struggle where attempts to control migrant labour clash with
moments of autonomy and resistance. My aim is to explore this field from a migration perspective, analysing rationales
of EU ‘migration management’ and their impact on migrants’ lives as well as investigating the strategies that migrants
develop in response. Based on an analysis of EU legislation and interviews with Italian activists in Berlin, I trace conflicts
around EU internal mobility and migrant labour. Against the background of critical migration studies, I analyse EU inter-
nal ‘migration management’, especially regarding the role of EU citizenship. Then, I look at EU migrant struggles in Berlin
through the lens of autonomy of migration, drawing on the example of the Italian activist group Berlin Migrant Strikers.
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1. Introduction
The effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and Euro-
pean austerity politics have reoriented migration flows
within the EU, increasing South-to-North migration with
Germany as a prime destination (IMIS & bpb, 2013,
p. 3).1 The various narratives of the German public dis-
course on the subject, for instance praise of the ‘brain
gain’ or the ‘fear’ of ‘benefit tourism’, boil down to a view
on (EU) migration that focuses on its economic ‘useful-
ness’ and tries to regulate and filter it accordingly (Ried-
ner, 2015). EU citizenship, promising equality and free-
dom of movement among EU citizens, turns out to be
a key instrument of such EU internal ‘migration man-
agement’. The emergence of (South European) migrant
activist groups in Germany, however, hints at another
force at play. In their demands for social rights and bet-
ter working conditions, migrant activists show they will
not allow themselves to be easily ‘managed’ into precar-
ious ‘productivity’.
1 While this article deals with South-to-North migration within the EU following the 2007–2008 financial crisis and European austerity politics, this is of
course neither the only nor the main form of migration occurring within the EU. EU internal East-to-West migration is ongoing and often centre-stage
when it comes to debates on EU ‘migration management’ (Schoenes & Schultes, 2014). This goes particularly for migrants from Bulgaria and Romania
whose freedom of movement within the EU is often called into question against the background of racist narratives (Schoenes & Schultes, 2014).
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Against this background, I argue that EU internal mo-
bility is a field of struggle where attempts to control mi-
grant labour clash with moments of autonomy (Bojadži-
jev & Karakayalı, 2007) and resistance. My intention is
to explore this field from the perspective of migration,
analysing rationales of EU ‘migration management’ and
their impact on migrant lives as well as investigating
strategies migrants develop with regard to it. I seek to of-
fer preliminary results for future research. My focus lies
with the specific context of South European, particularly
Italian, migration to Germany against the background of
European austerity politics and the dynamics between
Germany and Southern Europe. How does EU ‘migration
management’ function in this context and how do mi-
grant (activist) practices relate to it?
Based on an analysis of EU legislation and semi-
structured interviews with Italian migrant activists in
Berlin, I explore conflicts around EU internalmobility and
migrant labour. Drawing on critical migration research,
I start with a brief introduction on labour mobility in
the context of changing border regimes, which informs
my analysis of EU internal ‘migration management’ and
EU citizenship. Finally, I look at EU migrant struggles in
Berlin through the lens of autonomy of migration, draw-
ing on the example of the Italian activist group Berlin Mi-
grant Strikers.
2. Precarious Rights: EU ‘Migration Management’
2.1. Migrant Labour and Border Regimes
This article is based on an understanding of migration
as a key factor in capitalistic development, especially re-
garding the control and exploitation of labour (Mezzadra,
2006;Moulier-Boutang, 1998). Drawing on critical migra-
tion research, I conceptualizemigration as taking place in
a field of struggle where moments of autonomy and at-
tempts to control and regulate migration clash, interact
and bring about complex, ever-changing border regimes
(Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, p. 69). In the context of mul-
tiplying and increasingly heterogeneous borders (Casas-
Cortes et al., 2014, p. 57; Mezzadra, 2015, p. 128), crit-
ical migration scholars observe a multiplication of sta-
tus’ and social positions of migrants (Casas-Cortes et al.,
2014, p. 79). Using the concept of differential inclusion,
they describe processes that instead of bringing about
clear-cut inclusion or exclusion, produce a stratification
of rights, social positions, and belonging (Mezzadra &
Neilson, 2012, p. 67). This differential system of filtering
and segmentation, which functions as a measure of hier-
archisation and control (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2008, p. 7),
is linked to specific forms of ‘migration management’2
(Hess & Kasparek, 2010, p. 17) and entangled with what
Mezzadra and Neilson have described as the multiplica-
tion of labour (Mezzadra, 2016, p. 40), an increasing di-
versification of labour regimes and positionalities.
2.2. EU Citizenship and EU ‘Migration Management’
In this article, I look at a form of migration that due
to EU citizenship, not only seems privileged but in com-
parison to other forms of migration completely ‘de-
problematized’ since it is legally protected by the free-
dom of movement which exists for EU citizens. Since the
1990s, there has been ample scholarly debate around
the emergence of EU citizenship and its implication for
issues of migration:
Although its acquisition remained subordinated to
the status of citizens of member states of the EU, the
institution of European citizenship appeared to many
scholars as the opening up of a process of de-linking
citizenship from the principle of nationality that could
potentially run parallel to the recognition of migrants’
rights independently from their citizenship or evenmi-
gration status. (Mezzadra, 2015, p. 132)
In reality, however, it turned out to be different with EU
citizenship largely consolidating the differences between
EU citizens and ‘the rest’. Furthermore, the emergence
of EU citizenship has been accompanied by intensified
border and migration control as well as growing right-
wingmovements across Europe (Mezzadra, 2015, p. 132).
Mezzadra also emphasises “that in thewake of the global
crisis European citizenship has been stripped of any so-
cial and progressive meaning in the eyes of a wide ma-
jority of (not only Southern) European autochthonous
populations” (Mezzadra, 2015, p. 132). He thus consid-
ers the crisis to also encompass a crisis of—specifically
European—citizenship (Mezzadra, 2015, p. 133).
So how can we understand EU citizenship in the con-
text of migration (control)? How does it relate to Euro-
pean border and migration regimes? How can we anal-
yse it in the context of the multiplication of borders and
labour as well as differential inclusion?
2.2.1. Legal Framework
EU citizenshipwas introduced in the context of the Treaty
of Maastricht in 1992. Its current legal basis is articles
9 to 12 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), articles
18 to 25 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) as well as articles 39 to 46 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) (Bux, 2017). Cit-
izens of the member states, thereby, automatically be-
come EU citizens, with EU citizenship functioning not as
a replacement, but as an addition to national citizenship
(§20 TFEU). Much like the latter, “EU citizenship refers
2 Defined as attempts “to govern and manage migration, to operationalize policies of differential inclusion, and to manage the balance between the
needs of labor markets, the demands for rights and in some cases citizenship, and the projection of securitization and humanitarianism on the border”
(Casas-Cortes et al. 2014, p. 67 with reference to Walters, 2011). I will use this term—that was rightfully criticised for its cynicism—in single quotation
marks to describe said attempt because it captures the underlying perspective on migration and migrant labour.
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to a relationship between the citizen and the European
Union which is defined by rights, duties and political par-
ticipation” (Bux, 2017). The core elements of this rela-
tionship are freedom of movement within the EU, active
and passive voting rights in local elections in the place of
residence in the EU as well as the right to petition and
vote in the EU parliamentary elections in the country of
residence (§20 TFEU).
EU citizens’ freedom of movement within the EU has
its legal basis in article 3(2) TEU, article 21 as well as titles
IV and V TFEU and article 45 EUCFR. The general right
as established in the primary law is tied to certain con-
ditions and concretised in the EU Directive 2004/38/EC
(Voigt, 2017, p. 9). The directive states that EU citizens
have the right to move freely within the EU as well as to
reside for up to threemonths in another EU country with-
out having to fulfil any requirements (except for a valid
identity document or passport) (§4(1), §5(1), §6(1) Direc-
tive 2004/38/EC). For stays longer than threemonths cer-
tain criteria have to be met:3 EU citizens must either be
working or “have sufficient resources and sickness insur-
ance to ensure that they do not become a burden on
the social services of the host Member State during their
stay” (Marzocchi, 2017; §7 Directive 2004/38/EC). EU cit-
izens may acquire the right to permanent residence in
another EU country without further requirements “after
a five-year period of uninterrupted legal residence, pro-
vided that an expulsion decision has not been enforced
against them” (Marzocchi, 2017; §16(1), §21 Directive
2004/38/EC). Furthermore, article 24 of the directive stip-
ulates a requirement for equal treatment in comparison
to ‘natives’ in another EU country, for instance regard-
ing migrants’ involvement in the labour market. Restric-
tions on stays and the freedom of movement such as
the expulsion of EU citizens from other EU countries or
bans on staying in another member state are possible.
According to the directive, such measures may be taken
only based on concerns regarding public policy, public se-
curity, or public health (Marzocchi, 2017). The directive
also states that the measures must not be “taken on eco-
nomic grounds, complywith the proportionality principle
and…[be] based on personal conduct” (Marzocchi, 2017).
2.2.2. Underlying Rationales
As we have seen, primary law establishes EU citizenship
and with it freedom of movement within the EU. It pro-
vides such rights, however, under conditions and reg-
ulations which are in turn elaborated on in secondary
law, i.e., Directive 2004/38/EC. There, we note the im-
portance of economic criteria invoked regarding EU cit-
izens’ freedom of movement. These economic criteria,
and on a broader level the range of rights EU citizenship
entails (as well as their preconditions), have been sub-
ject to controversy. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
has played an important role in defining the ‘content’
of EU citizenship, the rights it entails and its relation to
certain (economic) criteria (Riedner, 2017, pp. 99-101).
While between the late 1990s and the early 2010s its
judgements seemed to pave the way for EU citizenship
as ‘social citizenship’ (entailing welfare access among
other things) (Buckel, 2013), in recent cases the tide has
turned. Against the background of debates on ‘benefit
tourism’ (see Jobelius & Stoiciu, 2014), the ECJ has vali-
dated national (particularly German) legislation that (in-
creasingly) limits EU citizens’ access to welfare and con-
firmed it does in fact not contradict EU legislation.
In the caseof ElisabetaDanoandher son, the ECJ ruled
that the exclusion of “economically inactive” EU citizens
without sufficient resources “from entitlement to certain
‘special non-contributory cash benefits’” does not contra-
dict EU legislation insofar as those citizens “do not have
a right of residence under Directive 2004/38 in the host
Member State” (Case C-333/13Dano vs. Jobcenter Leipzig,
2014, para. 93). In the case of Nazifa Alimanovic and her
family, that possibility of exclusion “from entitlement to
certain ‘special non-contributory cash benefits’” was ex-
tended to EU citizenswho reside in anothermember state
solely for the purpose of finding work (Case C-67/14 Ali-
manovic vs. Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln, 2015). In the case
of Jovanna García-Nieto and her family, the ECJ ruled that
EU citizens who are not working may be excluded “from
entitlement to certain ‘special non-contributory cash ben-
efits’” during the first threemonths of their stay in another
member state (Case C-299/14 García-Nieto and Others vs.
Jobcenter Kreis Recklinghausen, 2016).
In short, the ECJ ruling implies that EU citizens’ free-
dom of movement is neither automatic nor uncondi-
tional, their (equal) access to social rights is contingent
on their right of residence, which in turn is linked to eco-
nomic pre-conditions that are up for reviewby the respec-
tive state agencies (Kötter, 2016, pp. 3–4; Riedner, 2017,
p. 101). The result is that access to freedomofmovement
is contingent on economic criteria (Kötter, 2016, p. 4).
Full EU citizenship rights are available only under
economic preconditions, i.e., only “economically active”
EU citizens have access to social benefits, while “‘unem-
ployed persons’ or ‘job-seekers [with4 or] without rea-
sonable prospects of success’ forfeit their social rights
and may upon individual review also lose their right to
freedom of movement or even be expelled” (Riedner,
2015, p. 18, author’s translation). In other words, being
‘unproductive’ in the context of EU freedom of move-
ment becomes a punishable offence.5
3 It is important to note, however, that EU citizens (and their family members) always have a right of residence in other member states (even if the
criteria above aren’t met) unless it has officially been withdrawn in a bureaucratic procedure. Unlike third country nationals, they don’t require a visa
or residence permit (Voigt, 2017, p. 9). For a more detailed account of the criteria, see Voigt (2017).
4 C-67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln vs Alimanovic, 2015, paras. 52–58.
5 Alberti points out how in the UK even the criteria for retaining worker status become increasingly restrictive (2017, pp. 10–12). She also notes: “A para-
doxical situation arises: At the same time as work becomes more precarious, uncertain, temporary, and unable to provide for one’s own social repro-
duction, access to social protection is made dependent on the capacity to demonstrate a full worker status.” (2017, p. 16).
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EU citizenship’s limited social substance and the link
between freedom ofmovement and being ‘economically
active’ translates to an economization of citizenship and
a precarisation of citizenship rights. This reveals a ‘pro-
ductivity’ rationale of mobility regulation within the EU.
It shows an attempt to control or ‘manage’ migration in
a way that increases its economic ‘usefulness’, sanctions
‘unproductiveness’ and disciplines EU migrants into (pre-
carious) wage labour (Riedner, 2015, p. 18).
In her Munich case study, Riedner illustrates the bu-
reaucratic practice implementing this rationale:
Following the struggles of a family of EU internal mi-
grants inMunich it showshow social institutions…turn
into border guards, how the foreigners’ office be-
comes a labour activation agency and how this fosters
differential zones of equality and precarisation within
the richest city of Germany. (Riedner, 2017, p. 89)
She explains how in social institutions EU citizens’ re-
quests for social benefits may trigger investigations into
their residence status, turning these institutions into bor-
der guards to deter ‘unwanted migration’, while the for-
eigners’ office redefines its role, becoming “a labour ac-
tivation agency” (Riedner, 2017, p. 89). Riedner gives an
account of a meeting she had with a department chief
in the foreigners’ office who explained the rationale be-
hind their practice of sending out letters to EU citizens
threatening the loss of the right of residence or expul-
sion. Arguing that from an “aliens law point of view” ex-
pulsions rarely “made sense” because EU citizens could
almost always return immediately, their interventions
were supposed to push EU migrants into work, a strat-
egy that, according to Riedner, seems to prove effective
(2017, pp. 103–104).
It is against this background that Riedner and oth-
ers, such as Alberti (working on the situation in the UK)
link EU ‘migration management’ to workfarist social and
labour market policies.6 Alberti argues:
These processes appear instrumental to the ‘govern-
ment of mobility’ in Europe…, making migrants more
available, disposable, and compliant vis-a-vis their
employers. It is the reproduction of a precarious work-
force, with no social security cushion, under constant
risk of falling into poverty, and pushed to accept lower
standards that such regulatory restrictions concur to
generate (2017, p. 16, with reference to Leeds Solidar-
ity Network, 2015)
EU citizenship, hence, proves to be in linewith the above-
mentioned attempts to ‘manage’ migration in a prof-
itable fashion.
In relation to European migration regimes, two as-
pects emerge. On one hand, as mentioned, the emer-
gence of EU citizenship has been accompanied by in-
creasing the hierarchy between EU citizens and ‘third
country nationals’, a phenomenon Balibar has called “Eu-
ropean Apartheid” (Balibar, 2003). At the same time, hi-
erarchies amongst EU countries have been renewed and
intensified, and (thus) a multiplication of statuses within
EU citizenship has emerged (Nicolaus, 2014, p. 114).
Not only are we witnessing “intensified debate around
limitations on freedom of movement for EU citizens
that mainly targets Rumanian and Bulgarian citizens, but
whose concrete implementation would have decisive
consequences for EU internalmobility rights per se” (Kas-
parek & Tsianos, 2015, p. 5, author’s translation). Follow-
ing the 2007–2008 financial crisis and European austerity
politics, pre-existent North-South disparities within the
EU have also deepened (Nicolaus, 2014, pp. 114–115).
Critical scholars from Italy draw:
Comparisons between the currentNorth-South divide
in the EU and the historic roles within the Italian econ-
omy, where structurally weak and indebted Southern
regions were forced to function as a sales market and
a source of cheap labour for the industrialised North.
(Nicolaus, 2014, p. 115with reference to Curcio, 2013;
Rossi, 2013, author’s translation)
The interplay between racist narratives problematizing
certain EU internal migration, EU internal economic and
political disparities and a ‘productivity’-oriented EU cit-
izenship has produced a multiplication of borders and
a hierarchisation of spaces within the European Union.
Through the lens of differential inclusion, we can see
a stratification of rights emerging alongside multiplied
status positions among EU citizens.7 (This also—but
not only—becomes apparent in the attempts to ‘uti-
lize’ the ‘new’ South-North-migrations.) EU citizenship—
much like citizenship in general—is revealed to be a “dif-
ferentiation machine” (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, p. 84).
It not only amplifies the differences between EU citi-
zens and ‘the others’, its economic character and the
precarisation of rights within EU citizenship also cre-
ates stratifications—on a different level—along the lines
of EU internal (economic) inequalities, multiplies sta-
tus positions in the context of labour and migration,
and contributes to what I refer to as EU internal ‘mi-
gration management’. Drawing on Thomas H. Marshall,
one could argue that citizenship initially accomplishes
‘equality’, which then becomes the point of departure
for new inequalities (Köster-Eiserfunke, Reichhold, &
Schwiertz, 2014, p. 182, with reference to Marshall,
1992, pp. 52–54).
6 Social and labour market policies “based on the principle of fighting ‘welfare dependency’ by moving claimants into paid work through the introduction
of tougher welfare conditionality and sanctions” (Alberti, 2017, p. 2).
7 These reflect the economic and political disparities betweenmember states, citizens’ financial situations and the labourmarket position as well as racist
discourses. Alberti points out that EU citizenship is “layered” as certain “post-enlargement transitional measures”, for instance, specifically targeted EU
2-citizens and the racialization of some EU citizens also comes into play (2017, p. 5). The question of how racist discourses and economic rationales
interact within EU ‘migration management’ is important and should be addressed in future research.
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2.3. Migrant Practices
At the same time, perspectives such as İsin’s acts of cit-
izenship (2008), which refer to political practices of citi-
zenship beyond formal belonging and recognition, raise
the question ofmigrant practices in the context of EU citi-
zenship. Nicolaus, for instance, considers the increase of
EU internal South-to-North migration in the context of
the crisis a direct-democratic claim to EU citizens’ free-
dom of movement (2014, p. 116). In this sense, access-
ingwelfare benefits in Germany could also be considered
an act of recovery of the social rights that (German-led)
austerity politics have increasingly restrained in South-
ern Europe. However, it would be problematic to reduce
migrant practices and struggles to ‘civic’ acts of rights
claiming. Not only would such an idea of citizenship as an
overall progressive institution, which becomes increas-
ingly inclusive through (activist) rights claiming, mean
losing sight of the concept’s inherently exclusive nature
(cf. Köster-Eiserfunke et al., 2014, pp. 189–190; Mez-
zadra, 2015, pp. 133–135). The analysis of EU citizenship
shows: “Citizenship is not detached from the prevailing
social circumstances but contributes to them” (Köster-
Eiserfunke et al., 2014, p. 189, author’s translation). If
one’s perspective focuses on ‘civic’ acts of rights claiming
it will be difficult to fully understand migrant struggles
that are not about being included into existing structures,
but about challenging them. Those struggles do not nec-
essarily refer to rights or the responsibilities of certain in-
stitutions (Köster-Eiserfunke et al., 2014, p. 192), rather
they attempt to disrupt oppressive and exploitative struc-
tures and the processes that bring them about. The ques-
tion of migrant practices, thus, has to be raised on a
broader level while considering (EU) citizenship as an in-
stitutional framework, a repressive opponent and an op-
portune means all at the same time. Therefore, I will
address migrant practices within, through, and against
the framework of EU internal ‘migration management’
through EU citizenship in the following sections.
3. Resisting ‘Migration Management’: An Example of
EU Migrant Struggles in Berlin
3.1. Autonomy of Migration
In order to underline that migration cannot be reduced
to ‘objective’ economic or political conditions as well as
to emphasize the subjective side of migration and “its
ungovernable moments of freedom and excess” (Mez-
zadra, 2016, p.36), Moulier-Boutang, Mezzadra, and oth-
ers have developed the concept of autonomy of migra-
tion (Mezzadra, 2007, p. 180). The idea is to analyse mi-
gration not only from the perspective of the institutions
and structures, throughwhich itmoves, but instead think
of it as interacting with them (Bojadžijev & Karakayalı,
2007, p. 210). First, this means acknowledging that mi-
grants and their migration projects (built in the context
of transnational spaces and networks) along with their
dreams, hopes and plans attached to them are at the
centre of migratory movements (Bojadžijev & Karakay-
alı, 2007, pp. 210–212). This subjective side of the phe-
nomenon cannot simply be reduced to ‘objective’ fac-
tors such as political or economic circumstances and
exceeds attempts to control and regulate it (Mezzadra,
2007, p. 180). This subjectivity is a situated subjectiv-
ity. “It is not a given category, but one that develops
and changes with the social structures, in which action
is embedded. Those structures, however, are not them-
selves stable, but rather they are vehicles for social con-
tradictions, which are struggled over through and within
those structures” (Bojadžijev & Karakayalı, 2007, p. 213).
The thesis of autonomy is not meant to romanticize mi-
gration or trivialize border regimes. Instead, it points to
how we can only understand migration through its inter-
action with a concrete “historical conjuncture” of migra-
tion policy:
To speak of the movement of migration and its auton-
omy, thus, does not mean considering it to be sep-
arate or removed from social circumstances. Rather,
migrations exist as concrete practices entangled with
relations of power and dominance. (Bojadžijev &
Karakayalı, 2007, p. 214, author’s translation)
Against the background of a series of misconceptions
of the notion of autonomy of migration, Mezzadra sug-
gests a reformulation of the idea that on one hand em-
phasizes the link between migration and exploitation
while on the other hand puts migrant struggles centre
stage in the analysis (Mezzadra, 2007, p. 182 with ref-
erence to Bojadžijev, Karakayalı, & Tsianos, 2003). Em-
phasizing the subjective side of migration also means ac-
knowledging its political dimension and dynamic (Scheel,
2015, pp. 4–5). “Because migrants are the ones who
turn border regimes into sites of political struggle around
the gradual refusal and direct appropriation of mo-
bility and other resources” (Scheel, 2015, p. 5, au-
thor’s translation).
3.2. Berlin Migrant Strikers
Our focus in this article lies with the ‘new’ Italian mi-
gration to Germany, specifically Berlin, and the con-
flicts that have arisen in this context. Italian migration
to Germany is one example of the renewed increase
in EU internal South-to-North migration following the
2007–2008 financial crisis and subsequent austerity pol-
itics in (Southern) Europe (see Faraco Blanco, Kraußlach,
Montero Lange, & Pfeffer-Hoffmann, 2015, p. 7). The
socio-economic and socio-cultural composition of Italian
migration to Germany makes it an interesting case to
study the logic of EU ‘migrationmanagement’, especially
in the German context and its parallel narratives of ‘ben-
efit tourism’ and the ‘brain gain’. In a recent study, 75,8%
of Italian migrants to Germany held a university degree
(Kraußlach, Duschl, & Pfeffer-Hoffmann, 2015, p. 65). Yet,
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Italians also constitute the fourth largest group of EU mi-
grants receiving social benefits in Germany (Bundesagen-
tur für Arbeit, 2017). Berlin, in turn, provides an inter-
esting framework regarding the political activism that
has emerged in the context of the ‘new’ South Euro-
pean migration. Over the past years, a number of dif-
ferent political groups of South European migrants have
appeared in Berlin’s political landscape (see among oth-
ers 15M Berlín, 2014; Berlin Migrant Strikers, 2017; Ofic-
ina Precaria Berlín, 2017). Partly drawing on their po-
litical experience of anti-austerity movements in South-
ern Europe, they address the labour, housing and living
conditions of the so-called ‘new migrants’. Considering
their size and political positions, I do not consider these
groups to be representative of South European migrants
in Berlin. Rather, I consider them both an expression of
and a response to societal contradictions and conflicts
between EU ‘migrationmanagement’ and the autonomy
of migration.
Considering the explorative nature of this study, I de-
cided to draw on semi-structured interviews with EU mi-
grant activists (as experts in the field) for data collection.
Through political contacts in the Berlin left, I got in touch
with the Berlin Migrant Strikers (BMS), a political group
formed in 2014 by Italian activists to address (EU) mi-
grant living and working conditions in Germany. After
I presented myself, my political background as well as
the research project, five BMS activists, including Gior-
gio Del Vecchio, agreed to an interview. The interviews
were conducted in two different spaces the group was
using for its political activities at the time. For the analy-
sis (Mayring, 2015) of the collected data, I also drew on
information gathered during participant observation of
the BMS’ meetings. For this article, Giorgio Del Vecchio
offered further insight into the group’s political activities.
The BMS’ demographic and social composition is het-
erogeneous. Most activists are between the ages of 25
and 35. Some of them have lived in Berlin for years;
others are recent arrivals to the city. Regarding the
group’s socio-economic composition, Anna,8 one of the
activists, explains:
We have…a spectrum that ranges…from people
who…are here to study or for research purposes, to
people who have university degrees, but work in un-
related jobs or receive social benefits, to people who
have no formal qualifications and find themselves in
a similar situation as the previous group.
Politically, the BMS see themselves as part of an anti-
capitalist left. Due to the diversity of their political af-
filiations in Italy, however, they emphasize their anti-
dogmatic political practice.
3.2.1. Information Politics, Self-Help and Organisation of
Migrant Labour
The BMS’ political activity is informed by their analysis
of the specificity of EU migrant lives in Berlin. Much like
the author of—and contributor(s) to—this article, they
draw on and contribute to critical migration theory, and
are thus part of an exchange between academic and
activist knowledge (Hutta, Laister, zur Nieden & Hess,
2013). Against this background and their experience on
the ground, they considermigrant labour particularly vul-
nerable to precarious work, low pay and processes of de-
qualification, and point out the importance of (precar-
ious) migrant labour within the German economy. Fur-
thermore, they underscore the role the German welfare
state and its institutions play inmaking EUmigrant labour
increasingly precarious (see above). As described above,
the dynamic of increasing access restrictions (that never
amounts to a complete exclusion, however, cf. differen-
tial inclusion) proves to be an instrument in the ‘man-
agement’ of EU migrant labour. Faced with these cir-
cumstances, the BMS have adapted three common polit-
ical strategies to their situation: information politics, self-
help structures and organization of migrant labour.9
Information politics initially includes self-education
concerning labour market dynamics, labour rights and
the German welfare system. In the second step, the ac-
tivists distribute said information by producing informa-
tional material as well as by organising events and cam-
paigns targeted towards other migrant workers and the
wider public. This (counter)information, on one hand, is
supposed to tackle the problemofmisinformation or lack
of information (regarding German bureaucracy, labour
market dynamics as well as rights and possibilities for re-
sistance). According to the activists, many migrants en-
counter such misinformation which renders them partic-
ularly vulnerable to bureaucratic arbitrariness and prob-
lematic working conditions. On the other hand, BMS ac-
tivists view it as a sort of counter-propaganda against
reactionary narratives such as that of ‘benefit tourism’
in Germany or the ‘myth’ of the ‘modello tedesco’ in
Italy.10 The third element of their information politics,
the group’s social counselling service for Italian migrants,
has a number of different functions. First, according to
the activists, the users of the group’s counselling ser-
vice provide themwith information regarding new strate-
gies of their employers and German bureaucracy. Sec-
ond, the users receive information about their rights and
possible ways of resisting the situations they face, which,
third, according to the activists, makes the counselling
service an instrument of politicisation.
The BMS’ second main strategy is what I have called
self-help. Based on their experience of individual hard-
ship, they built a collective support net, where resources
8 The interviewees’ names are anonymised.
9 I will give an account of the BMS’ political practices and goals as per the activists’ description in order to illustrate the conflicts that arise around EU
‘migration management’. The data, however, does not allow for an evaluation of their effectiveness or scope.
10 Germany’s ‘economic success’ has become a discursive feature in Italian politics and is used to legitimize labour market or social reforms that cut back
labour rights or social benefits.
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are collectivised andmade accessible to all. This includes
sharing living spaces, work opportunities and organising
fundraisers to help group members in financial trouble.
According to the activists, it is an attempt to address the
problems arising from precarious work and restricted ac-
cess to social welfare in a collective and solidary manner.
The group’s third main strategy is about organising
migrant labour. Against the backgroundof a lack of union
activity in the sectors where migrants frequently work,
the BMS support migrant labour struggles through in-
formation campaigns as well as active participation in
strike pickets and demonstrations. Building on these ex-
periences, they formed a network with other migrant
activist groups that specifically supports migrant labour
struggles in Berlin.
3.2.2. Transnational Struggles and Hierarchical Spaces
The activists consider the BMS to be a transnational mi-
grant self-organisation that builds on the political poten-
tial of (EU) migrants as political subjects emerging from
their specific material conditions of life. To them, it is the
collective political antithesis to the individualising ten-
dencies of precarious migrant labour and the conform-
ing individualist ‘I can do this’-mentalities. They consider
their position as EU migrants to be a social perspective,
from which they analyse societal structures and dynam-
ics, actively intervene in those structures and dynamics
as well as relate to other groups.
A common typology of “migrants’ transnational po-
litical practices” is Østergaard-Nielsen’s (2003) distinc-
tion between “immigrant politics” and “homeland poli-
tics”. She defines the former as “the political activities
that migrants or refugees undertake to better their situ-
ation in the receiving country”, while the latter refers to
“migrants’ and refugees’ political activities pertaining to
the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland” (2003,
p. 762). While the BMS’ political activity addresses both
the Italian and the German context, it does so in a way
that exceeds those definitions. They address these con-
texts as interrelated and interactingwithin economic and
political power structures, such as in the case of Euro-
pean austerity politics. Their status as Italian migrants in
Germany relates to the role of Germany in Italian auster-
ity politics. The framework, which binds the BMS’ various
contexts of action and reference, is the EU as a hierarchi-
cally structured space, which they navigate through EU
citizenship. Their political activity has a transnational di-
mension which takes the form of a counterpart to the
inter- and supranational power structures that they face.
The activists’ view on their presence in Germany as
well as their political activity in the country is twofold. On
one hand, they consider themselves an expression of the
crisis and austerity politics in Southern Europe, hence,
an expression of existing power relations. On the other
hand, they argue, that precisely due to the economic role
of migrant labour in Germany, they have the potential to
disrupt said power relations.
Our analysis of the BMS’ political activities from the
perspective of autonomy of migration reveals two as-
pects. In the context of EU ‘migration management’, EU
citizenship constitutes an institutional framework, a re-
pressive opponent, and an opportune means to their
struggles all at the same time. ‘Migration management’
through EU citizenship structures their lives in Germany
and frames their political project. The latter draws on
the instruments at hand, but in a misappropriating way;
BMS activists use EU citizens’ freedom of movement not
(only) in order to find work in Germany, but also to ve-
hemently claim the social rights that they are increas-
ingly denied both in Italy and by German as well as EU
legislation. They point to fragments of a social compo-
nent of EU citizenship, demand those fragments and go
beyond them until they find themselves outside its ‘pro-
ductivity’ rationale. The BMS’ activism is, thus, partly lo-
cated in between İsin’s active and activist citizenship be-
cause their starting point is the precarity of the rights
granted to them, but their demands move beyond those
rights. However, the notion of citizenship from below
does not do justice to their kind of political activity. They
do not (just) want to claim a series of rights from a
specific state or the EU. Their aim is that of disrupting
capitalist rationales beyond the notion of rights. Against
this background, the transnational dimension of their
political activity becomes important. The BMS activists’
use of EU freedom of movement generates potential for
a transnationalisation of South European anti-austerity
movements which could re-politicise capital-labour con-
tradictions in the economic and political centre of Eu-
rope. Migrant struggles, thus, create the possibility of a
“migration of struggles” (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014, p. 83).
If you create a part of Europe around you that suffers
from austerity politics, welfare cuts, unemployment
and labour reforms, which destroy workers’ rights,
you will face a migration that either becomes func-
tional to you, that becomes ‘productive’, or that be-
comes a problem. (Anna, 2016)
4. Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to trace struggles around EU
internal mobility as they emerge in the political activity
of Italian migrants in Berlin. Looking at South-to-North
migration following the 2007–2008 financial crisis and
European austerity politics, I analysed the dynamics be-
tween EU internal ‘migration management’ and EU mi-
grant struggles in Berlin.
Drawing on critical migration research, I showed how
EU citizenship provides the framework for an EU inter-
nal ‘migration management’ that on one hand cements
the disparities between EU citizens and ‘the rest’, while
on the other hand introduces and valorises differences
amongst EU citizens. In the context of ‘economic’ EU cit-
izenship, EU internal freedom of movement (for EU cit-
izens) is hinged on a diktat of ‘productivity’ and EU citi-
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zenship is, hence, almost ‘free’ of ‘social substance’. This
specific dynamic of ‘migration management’ amplifies
the pre-existing tendency of migrant labour to be precar-
ious. In the context of increasing economic and political
disparities emerging from the 2007–2008 financial crisis
and European austerity politics, this instrument develops
a particular efficacy.
The emergence of (South European) migrant activist
groups in Germany, hints at another force at play. In their
demands for social rights and better working conditions,
migrant activists show they will not allow themselves
to be easily ‘managed’ into precarious ‘productivity’. In
the face of precarious work and increasingly restricted
access to German welfare systems, the BMS make use
of information politics, self-help, and organisation of mi-
grant labour in order to strengthen migrant resistance
and to intervene discursively. Their political organising
is informed by theoretical concepts and reveals links be-
tween academia and activism. They consider their or-
ganisation a transnational migrant self-organisation that
builds on the political potential of EU migrants as politi-
cal subjects emerging from their specific material living
conditions. My analysis is that the transnational dimen-
sion of their political activity mirrors the inter- and supra-
national power structures, which they navigate through
EU citizenship. Along these lines, the BMS consider their
presence and political activity in Germany both to be an
expression of these power structures and to have the
potential to disrupt them. We find that their political
project makes use of the instruments at their disposal,
but in a misappropriating way, which goes beyond their
intended scope. From the perspective of the autonomy
of migration, BMS activists use a ‘productivity’-oriented
EU citizenship in subversive ways. Their political strug-
gles and the way they relate to South European anti-
austerity movements point to the possibility of migrant
struggles turning into a ‘migration of struggles’.
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